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of which target inflation over the 1999-2009 period. I find that central bank 
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Inflation forecasts lie at the heart of most central banks’ monetary policy strategies, 
whether or not the monetary authority is mandated to achieve a numerical inflation 
objective. Yet, there is no such thing as a single or unique inflation forecast. A wide 
variety of forecasts are published and they reflect differences not only about the future 
but are constructed based on different information sets, a well being more or less 
sensitive to constant stream of macroeconomic news or information published by 
increasingly transparent central banks. Astonishingly, however, there are comparatively 
few attempts to measure, let alone explain, how and why forecasts disagree. Why 
should we be interested in forecast disagreement? Bernanke (2008, 2007), among 
others, observed that economists have yet to fully grasp the dynamics on inflation and, 
by implication, inflation expectations. Consequently, policy makers as well as 
academics are still searching for explanations about the ingredients necessary to 
anchor (i.e., render relatively insensitive inflation expectations to the arrival of new 
information) inflation in both the short-run and the long-run. Indeed, Bernanke (2007) 
suggests that while long-run expectations are not “perfectly anchored in real 
economies” he goes on to say that “…the extent to which they are anchored can 
change, depending on economic developments and (most importantly) the current and 
past conduct of monetary policy.” Given the benign nature of inflation in the past decade 
or more, especially in the industrial world, Bernanke might be forgiven for believing that 
this outcome reflects well-anchored inflationary expectations, although U.S. evidence 
suggests that long-run inflation expectations may not be as stable as we think (e.g, see 
Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005)). 
This paper begins with the observation that different forecasts are unequally sensitive to 
incoming economic developments. There is considerable debate in the literature about 
the reasons behind this stylized fact and, in particular, the role played by information 
emanating from central banks. Whatever the sources of this sensitivity it is clear that 
there is considerable disagreement in inflation forecasts. Indeed, unlike similar studies 
that typically examine the range of forecasts from a single source, this paper suggests 
that there is something to be gained from an analysis of as wide a variety of forecast  
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types as data availability permits. It is precisely by estimating the amount of forecast 
disagreement across various kinds of forecasts, from professional to central banks 
through to survey-based forecasts, that observers can determine, for example, how 
central bank transparency, or the choice of a monetary policy strategy, influences 
forecast disagreement.  If the conduct of monetary policy is crucial to a central bank’s 
ability to anchor inflationary expectations then it is also useful to ask to what extent 
inflation forecasts are driven by local or domestic factors as opposed to global 
influences. While both are no doubt reflected in realized inflation rates most central 
banks have come to the conclusion that global factors have played an increasingly 
important role during the last decade (e.g., see IMF 2006). The foregoing observations 
suggest that there is still a great deal to be learned from observing varieties of inflation 
forecasts in order to understand what drives forecast disagreement.  
The aim of this paper then is to estimate a model of forecast disagreement and ask to 
what extent global versus domestic factors are part of the explanation, the influence of 
central bank transparency and the monetary policy strategy, as well as other variables 
that reflect changes in economic developments. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides definitions of 
forecast disagreement and considers the state of the theoretical debate concerning the 
role of transparency and the informational and other constraints, some self-imposed, 
reflected in forecasts for inflation which may give rise to forecast disagreement. Section 
3 describes the data and outlines the econometric modeling strategy followed. Empirical 
results are discussed in section 4 prior to some conclusions being drawn in section 5.  
Briefly, the principal conclusion is that changes in central bank transparency are a 
critical element in influencing forecast disagreement over time. In particular, central 
bank transparency raises forecast disagreement. Hence, forecasters do not become 
more complacent when central banks are more open about the current and future 
outlook and their monetary policy strategy is more clearly defined. Moreover, the 
adoption of an inflation targeting (IT) policy strategy has had little effect on forecast 
disagreement. During the sample considered in this study the IT strategy became both 
more mature and at the same time less distinguishable from comparable monetary  
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policy strategies. In addition, it is also clear that what drives forecast disagreement is 
not only sensitive to the type of forecast examined (e.g., professional versus survey-
based forecasts) but the precise location in the distribution of forecast disagreement 
one examines.    
2.  Forecast Disagreement: Measurement and Relevant Literature 
A convenient way of expressing how much forecasters disagree with each other is to 
evaluate the degree of dispersion across forecasts of the same variable, in the present 
case the rate of change in a Consumer Price Index. As pointed out recently by Leduc, 
Rudebusch, and Weidner (2009), the concept is frequently overlooked by observers 
who track and report on the evolution of the state of the macro-economy. On the one 
hand, this is surprising given that evidence of disagreement may provide clues, for 
example, about how different forecasters interpret the manner in which monetary policy, 
in particular, may be implemented in future.  In turn, policy makers would be interested 
in these developments if they portend a relatively different interpretation than the one 
the monetary authority has been trying to communicate. Yet, since the world economy 
has only recently exited a state of ‘Great Moderation’, as the period beginning around 
the mid-1980s up until the mid 2000s has been referred to (e.g., Bernanke 2004), there 
has arguably been less reason to focus on the sources of disagreement across 
forecasters.
1  Granger (1996) suggests, however, that much can be learned from 
considering varieties of forecasts. “If an economy goes through a period when it is 
relatively easy to forecast, resulting in narrow probability intervals, a group of competent 
forecasters of comparable quality should be in agreement, but if the economy is difficult 
to forecast you can expect less agreement between forecasters, unless they 
collaborate.”  
There is no universally agreed upon statistic for forecast disagreement. Nevertheless, 
the dispersion of forecasts used to quantify forecast disagreement is generally 
measured in one of three ways: the squared deviations in individual forecasts (e.g., 
Lahiri and Sheng (2008)), the inter-quartile range of forecasts (e.g., Mankiw, Reis, and 
Wolfers (2003), Capistrán and Timmermann (2008)), or some normalized absolute 
                                                 
1 It is worth pointing out that Bernanke explicitly mentions the Great Moderation did not reach Japan.   
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deviation of forecasts (e.g., Banternghansa and McCracken (2009)).  While all three 
versions of disagreement were evaluated in this study the results reported below focus 
on the squared deviation measure both to conserve space, as well we because the 
main conclusions drawn from the empirical evidence were unaffected by the chosen 
indicator of forecast disagreement.   
Let 
j
th d  represent forecast disagreement at time t, for a forecast of horizon h, produced 
















   (1) 
 where  F is the forecast for inflation, Nj is the number of forecasts, i identifies the 
forecast, while 
j F represents the mean forecast value across forecasters in economy j. 
For the purposes of the econometric study to follow, forecast disagreement is first 
evaluated for each source (i.e., each i in equation (1)). The mean value of d is then 
calculated for each economy j in the dataset. Disaggregated estimates of  t d are also 
evaluated for each  set of forecasts. These include central banks as a group, survey-
based forecasts, forecasts for the U.S.A. only as a possible benchmark for the global 
dimension of forecast disagreement, a set of common or core forecasts from 
forecasters that provide inflation forecasts for each one of the economies in the sample 
(i.e., OECD, IMF, Consensus), and a group consisting of all non survey-based forecasts.  
Grouping forecasts is likely to be useful for a variety of reasons. Some of the data used 
in this study are projections, others are actual forecasts. The time, effort, and expertise, 
invested into producing a view about the future is also likely to differ considerably 
across organizations. Moreover, the governing assumptions and models (whether of the 
implicit or explicit variety) used to generate estimates of the likely future course of 
inflation are also likely to differ considerably across the available sources. The proposed 
groupings represent an attempt to get at these differences in an approximate fashion.  
In spite of the simplicity of the measure of equation (1) there are relatively few empirical 
studies that examine the evolution or sources of forecast disagreement over time. 
Dovern, Fritsche, and Slacalek (2009) consider the set of forecasters in the Consensus  
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group of forecasters in the G-7 and find that the dynamics of forecasts of real variables 
(e.g., real GDP growth) differs substantially from those of nominal forecasts, such as the 
inflation rate that is the focus of the present study. Banternghansa and McCracken 
(2009) rely on one of the alternative measures of forecast disagreement because they 
are interested in disagreement among members of the U.S. Fed’s Federal Open Market 
Committee about the outlook for the U.S. economy.
2   Interestingly, one of their 
conclusions is that forecast accuracy may well take a back seat to other considerations, 
such as ideology, while the Fed’s Vice-Chair apparently plays a consensus building role. 
This finding is especially true for the inflation variable (also see Ellison and Sargent 
(2009)) and raises all kinds of questions about the value of these forecasts for central 
banks struggling to decide how transparent they should be. I return to this issue below.  
Relying on the inter-quartile range across the U.S. Survey of Professional Forecasters, 
Capistrán and Timmermann (2009) report a noticeable drop in forecast disagreement 
since the early 1980s and point to the changing conditional volatility of inflation as one 
of the sources of changes in dispersion. Siklos (2010) relies on a version of equation (1) 
to highlight some of the differences in forecast disagreement, between inflation and 
non-inflation targeting economies, since the early 1990s and finds that inflation forecast 
disagreement vis-à-vis the U.S., the latter a proxy for global forces affecting inflation 
forecasts, has declined in recent years. 
It is considerably more difficult to find theoretical guidance about what explains or drives 
inflation forecast disagreement.  Capistrán and Timmermann (2009) claim that 
forecasters possess an asymmetric loss function, that agents are heterogeneous, and 
that biases in inflation forecasts are persistent but can shift as between high and low 
volatility periods. The assumption of asymmetric loss and heterogeneous agents is 
hardly controversial. However, their finding of a significant empirical link between the 
level and conditional inflation forecasts is dependent on being able to fit, for example, a 
GARCH-type model to inflation (also see Lahiri and Sheng (2008)). The period under 
                                                 
2 These are reported in the twice-yearly Monetary Policy Report submitted to Congress.  
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study is not amenable to such interpretations about the conditional volatility of inflation.
3 
Many explorations of the behavior of inflation and, by implication, expectations or 
forecasts of inflation, rely on the concept of price stickiness (e.g., Mankiw and Reis 
(2002, 2006)). As a result, this imparts some persistence to inflation, as well as inflation 
forecasts, together with some biases in forecast errors and insensitivity to 
macroeconomic news. Their hypothesis is supported by U.S. data from a variety of 
sources (also see Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003)).  
An alternative view that also gives rise to persistence is the inability of economic agents 
to process all of the available information (e.g., see Sims (2006), and sources within). 
This is particularly relevant under the current circumstances because forecasts from 
different sources are likely to be based on vastly different abilities to translate relevant 
macroeconomic information into a point forecast for inflation. For example, a central 
bank’s forecast will likely rely on a suite of econometric models with varying degrees of 
sophistication. At the other end of the spectrum forecasts derived from survey-based 
measures will likely be based on more emotional views about the likely course of future 
price developments. Yet another interpretation of the behavior of inflation and inflation 
forecasts invites the possibility that, even if the information set agents use to form 
expectations is the same, these same individuals may interpret differently the signals 
contained in the information set (e.g., see Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2007)).  
Turning to more qualitative influences on the determinants of forecast disagreement 
these derive exclusively from the behavior of inflation and forecasts of inflation under 
different monetary regimes. For example, inflation can be reduced via the granting of 
central bank autonomy and, to the extent that the central bank is able to act credibly 
and independently from political pressure, lower inflation should be the norm. 
Presumably, a common belief in the promise of lower inflation ought to generate less 
disagreement about future inflation, unless the monetary authority possesses little 
credibility. The same argument applies to the role of enhanced central bank 
transparency (e.g., van der Cruijsen and Demertzis 2007).  
                                                 
3 In other words, it is not difficult to fit a sensible GARCH(1,1) type model to inflation for any of the 
economies considered in this study (1999-2009). Other types of conditional volatility models (e.g., 
TARCH) were not much more successful.   
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There are potentially important qualifications to the connection between central bank 
transparency and inflation expectations with implications for how forecast disagreement 
responds in an environment of enhanced transparency. First, transparency comes in 
different forms (e.g., see Dincer and Eichengreen 2007). Some forms of transparency 
such as policy and political transparency may well assist in the reduction of forecast 
disagreement since the central bank would be expected to keep inflation within fairly 
narrow bounds. This constraint would be more binding still in the case of central banks 
that must meet a quantified inflation objective, as is true of inflation targeting central 
banks. However, if there is little or no economic transparency, then forecasters and the 
public more generally, may not be much further ahead in knowing what the central bank 
is thinking and how it might react depending on the type of macroeconomic shocks 
hitting the economy. Moreover, even if there are improvements in all forms of 
transparency, the sheer increase in the volume of information produced by central 
banks, and perhaps by other observers of the central bank, may well have the effect of 
raising disagreement about future inflation. Limits in the ability to process information 
could well come into play in achieving this outcome.  
Matters become still more complicated if the mix of enhanced transparency and the 
record of a monetary authority that is able to deliver on its inflation target, or promise of 
some form of price stability, has the effect of raising the ‘rational’ inattention of 
forecasters by lulling agents into a form of complacency. If forecasts reflect the fact that 
inflation will be close to the target they may well increasingly ignore incoming 
information about shocks hitting the economy and become ‘lazy’ about processing 
information previously used to generate a forecast. In this sense, the provision to public 
information can be detrimental where this is interpreted here to mean a rise in forecast 
disagreement (e.g., see Morris and Shin (2002)). Nevertheless, if the information 
provided is ‘clear’, then one would expect less disagreement vis-à-vis the central bank’s 
own expectations (Morris and Shin (2005)). In the presence of a formal inflation target 
one would expect this expectation to be the announced numerical objective over the 
horizon promised by the monetary authority.  
Yet another difficulty with the role of transparency and the presence of an inflation target 
is the possibility that they cannot be treated as exogenous determinants of forecast  
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disagreement. It is conceivable, for example,  that a government and a central bank 
may choose to adopt a combination of greater transparency together with an inflation 
target in order to facilitate the coordination of inflation expectations. Even so, the 
success of such a strategy will still hinge on the credibility of policy makers to deliver the 
promised outcome. As will be shown below an inflation target, even one successful by 
most standards, is no barrier either to forecast disagreement or to inflation forecasts 
that depart from the announced inflation target, at least in the short-run.  
Svensson (2006) demonstrates that the provision of more information is actually 
beneficial. Since not all the central banks in this study publish an inflation forecast, and 
some that do report a forecast for a version of inflation that is not exactly the same as a 
standard CPI inflation measure
4, we cannot directly investigate some of the foregoing 
implications of changing central bank transparency. However, an indicator of central 
bank transparency can be brought to bear on the data and can serve as an indirect 
measure of the role of information provision on inflation forecast disagreement.  It is 
worth noting that Ehrmann, Eijffinger and Fratzscher (EEF; 2010) report strong 
empirical evidence for twelve countries, seven of which belong to the EU, while five of 
the countries in their sample target inflation, favoring a role for central bank 
communication, transparency, and inflation targeting. In particular, they favor the 
reliance on a central bank’s own forecast, together with a numerical objective, as critical 
elements leading to reduced forecast dispersion.
5   
Based on some of the theoretical findings surveyed above there is a strong case to be 
made for an inflation target and greater central bank transparency increasing forecast 
disagreement. The presence of clear objectives, and a central bank committed to 
attaining its policy objective, arguably can lead to more resources being devoted to 
                                                 
4 For example, the FOMC in the U.S. reports a forecast for the Personal Consumption Expenditures 
deflator. The Bank of Japan’s Monetary Policy Board reports a forecast for CPI inflation that excludes 
fresh food prices. 
5 Their study in interested in a variety of forecasts, not just inflation. They rely on monthly data, covering 
the period from 1995 to 2008, from two sources, namely Consensus forecasts and the EC Household 
Survey. The present study relies on a much wider set of forecasts although EEF consider the individual 
forecasts that, for example, make up the monthly Consensus forecasts. Instead, I rely on the average of 
such forecasts.   
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divining what inflation might be in future. This outcome may also be encouraged if the 
central bank also publishes its own inflation forecast. Whether this is welfare enhancing 
is a different question. Walsh (2007) makes it clear that optimal transparency is reduced 
if the central bank improves its ability to forecast aggregate demand shocks but the 
results can be reversed when the issue revolves around the provision of advance 
warnings of aggregate supply shocks. Since Walsh’s model focuses on the case of 
inflation targeting central banks there is the real possibility that agents living under such 
a regime actually become more sensitive to information released by their central banks. 
In the present context this means that forecast disagreement would be relatively higher 
in economies with a formal inflation target though the degree of sensitivity would also be 
a function of the release (and accuracy) of a central bank forecast. In a similar vein, 
Cornand and Heinemann (2008) make the distinction between the precision of central 
bank announcements and the publicity generated by such announcements. It is 
conceivable that both are conditions more likely to be met in economies with a formal 
inflation target not only for accountability reasons but also because IT central banks 
tend to be relatively more transparent. Under these conditions, Cornand and 
Heinemann show that increasing the precision of information is welfare enhancing. Not 
limiting the degree of publicity surrounding information releases results in an increase in 
the likelihood that expectations will be coordinated. Consequences include the negative 
welfare implications of the kind predicted by Morris and Shin (2002).  
The ambiguity surrounding theoretical predictions is natural under the circumstances. 
Monetary policy regimes differ around the world, as does central bank transparency. 
Moreover, it is exceedingly difficult to identify rational inattention from complacency or 
other forms of inefficient information processing skills. Empirical evidence can at least 
contribute to determining the extent and sources of forecast disagreement. However, 
unlike much of the extant literature, this study relies on a wider variety of forecast 
sources than heretofore has typically been the case to explore cross-country 
determinants of forecast disagreement.   
3. Econometric  Methodology  and  Data 
3.1 Econometric Methodology  
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Our interest in this study is to examine the empirical significance of the determinants of 
forecast disagreement, as defined in equation (1). It is convenient to distinguish 
between quantitative and qualitative factors. Hence, we can write 
  (,)
j jj j
tt t t dg    XZ  (2) 
where  j denotes the economy in question, X and Z are country-specific vectors of 
quantitative and qualitative determinants of forecast disagreement (d), at time t, while  
indicates the possibility that, as discussed previously, macroeconomic information is 
likely digested differently, with possibly different consequences for inflation forecast 
disagreement, across types of forecasts while , of course, is an error term. Equation (2), 
therefore, reflects the possibility that the level of disagreement, and the sensitivity of 
disagreement to its determinants, is conceivably different as between professionals, 
central banks, and households, or other groups of forecasters.  
We consider several quantitative determinants of d. First, theory suggests that current 
and past monetary policy performance will partly dictate the degree of forecast 
disagreement. Inflation in consumer prices is a natural proxy to consider for this 
purpose. The relative importance of these factors remains in dispute with IMF (2006), 
Borio and Filardo (2006), and Bohl, Mayes, and Siklos (2010) finding in favor of the 
globalization and inflation hypothesis while Ball (2006), Ihrig et.al. (2007) conclude 
otherwise. The relative importance of global and domestic factors is also likely to be 
partly determined according to whether the forecast is a professional one, including 
forecasts made by central banks, or one made by households or businesses. The latter 
may be more influenced by domestic considerations alone than by external factors.   
Professional forecasters, and central banks, on the other hand, may be more sensitive 
to the role played by the growing integration of goods and financial markets. Because 
the decomposition into global and domestic factors is not directly observed it is useful to 
consider a factor model. The following specification serves as the starting point.  
  tt t A' =  (L)+	 

  (3)  
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where  t 
  is the vector of observable endogenous variables, A’ are the inputs (i.e., the 
time series) from which the factors are derived, (L)is a distributed lag function, and 	is 
the residual term. Several variants are considered in defining the vector  t 
 . Given the 
discussion in the previous section concerning differences in information sets and the 
degree of inattention that exists amongst forecasters, the vector is defined alternatively 
to include all forecasts across all the economies in the sample, only survey-based 
forecasts, central bank forecasts, or a core of forecasts that is common across all the 
economies considered.
6   As defined, all vectors consist of domestic and foreign 
forecasts of inflation. Nevertheless, an allowance is made for the possibility that the 
number of variables used to extract domestic versus global components of inflation 
forecasts can differ. The vector of quantitative variables is rounded out by including 
commodity price inflation, a term spread, the output gap, and an asset prices gap. A 
role for commodity prices in explaining forecast disagreement stems from their role in 
influencing inflation in the short-run, as most recently demonstrated during the run-up 
and subsequent reversal in oil prices in the 2007-2009 period especially. More 
generally, commodity prices have long played a role in forecasting models and this also 
serves to highlight the critical importance of distinguishing between aggregate demand 
and supply shocks. The term spread too has been a staple of models used to forecast 
inflation and future economic activity and is, therefore, also included in the estimated 
specification. A similar interpretation explains the inclusion of the output gap about 
which controversy has recently centered over its importance as a consistent 
determinant of inflation, especially in the debate over the proper specification of the 
Phillips curve. Finally, evaluations about the conduct of monetary policy have for some 
years debated the role of asset prices. Space constraints prevent a theoretical 
discussion concerning their role in determining the stance of monetary policy. 
Nevertheless, while some observers have lamented the failure of some central banks to 
adequately account for asset price developments, it is an empirical question whether 
                                                 
6 There is nothing to prevent the inclusion of realized macroeconomic time series as variables entering 
equation (3). However, under the assumption that the vector of forecasts already incorporates this 
information, this addition appears superfluous. Were these to be incorporated into the factor model 
specification used here, an additional term would have to be added to equation (3).  
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forecasters more generally have incorporated information about asset price 
developments into their forecasts. 
Turning to qualitative determinants two variables are considered. A cross-country 
evaluation of the determinants of forecast disagreement must control for whether the 
economy in question explicitly targets inflation. In addition, central banks are also 
distinguished by how transparent they are. As previously discussed the connection 
between these two qualitative features on the conduct of monetary policy and forecast 
disagreement is, in theory, ambiguous but likely central to an understanding of what 
explains forecast disagreement.    
For reasons that will become more apparent below, equation (2) will be estimated in two 
different ways. The distribution of inflation forecast disagreement is often concentrated 
in the tails of the distribution (see below). Hence, a conventional mean regression may 
well be unable to capture the relationship as specified in equation (2). Instead, equation 
(2) is estimated via the quantile regression (QR) method (e.g., see Koenker (2005)). 
The QR approach permits a richer examination of the statistical relationship between 
covariates, by estimating how the conditional quantiles of forecast disagreement are 
influenced by the variables that reflect of both quantitative and qualitative influences on 
forecast disagreement. In regression form, equation (2) would be written as 
 
1
01 2 (, ) ( )
jj j j
tt t t d QF    
    XZ X Z  (4) 
where  X and Z were defined previously,   are the quantiles, and F denotes the 
common distribution of the errors.  Equation (4) is then estimated for each economy 
individually. Note that since inflation forecasts are decomposed into domestic and global 
factors, as explained above, the inclusion of the latter implies that individual 
specifications do take account of foreign influences on domestic inflation forecast 
disagreement. Whether this form of conditioning is sufficient is an empirical question.  
Alternatively, we can estimate equation (2) in a panel setting with proper allowance for 
the potential endogeneity of some of the right hand side variables. For example, it is 
likely that while past inflation performance will partially determine forecast disagreement  
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there is also the possibility that current inflation may affect how much disagreement 
there is over the future course of inflation. Similar arguments apply to some of the other 
presumed determinants of forecast disagreement, such as the degree of transparency 
and whether the economy in question explicitly targets inflation. GMM estimation seems 
called for under the circumstances.
7 In this connection an important question is whether 
to use a difference GMM which takes account of the time series dimension of the data. 
Nevertheless, as will be seen below, while there is evidence that differencing is 
appropriate, suggestive of the need to estimate a dynamic panel model (i.e., the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) type estimator; also see Arellano and Bover (1995)), the 
results also point to the possibility that resort to orthogonal deviations might be 
preferred in order to remove individual effects (e.g., see Hayakawa (2009)).  A related 
problem is that of weak instruments. The F-test based on the first stage regression 
developed by Staiger and Stock (1997) when one of the regressors (here the likely 
culprit is realized inflation) is endogenous is used to check for weak instruments.
8 
Another potential concern is that, under the circumstances, there is the danger that 
resort to a dynamic panel GMM can lead to a proliferation of instruments (Roodman 
(2009)). The number of instruments is kept to a minimum but it is also the case that the 
instrument set in this study appears to overcome the weak instruments problem.  
3.2 Data and Practical Considerations 
An appendix provides details of the data sources and other details about the inflation 
forecasts used in this study. All estimates presented in the following section are based 
on data converted to the quarterly frequency. The estimates to be discussed below 
consider the experience of nine economies, five of which explicitly target inflation. The 
inflation targeting (IT) group of countries consists of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
Sweden, and the U.K. The remaining economies considered are: the euro area, Japan, 
Switzerland, and the U.S.A.  The full sample is from 1999Q1 to 2009Q4, inclusive. 
                                                 
7 The specifications were also estimated using instrumental variable estimation in a panel setting. Overall, 
the conclusions are broadly consistent with the ones reported in the next section.  
8 The first stage regression is separately estimated for each individual economy considered. As far as I 
am aware there are no tests for weak instruments in dynamic panel models.  
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While forecasts are available for a longer time period, including data for the decade of 
the 1990s
9 would have to contend with the problem of taking account of the disinflation 
that defined the experience of all of the economies in the dataset. Moreover, the 
economies in the sample that explicitly target inflation were in the early phase of the 
introduction of this policy regime.
10 Given the record of inflation in previous decades it is 
also doubtful that credibility was achieved immediately.
11   It is also convenient to 
generate estimates over a sample period from the time the euro area was created. 
Specifications that include data prior to 1999 would have to cope with more ‘artificial’ 
estimates of inflation for the euro zone, let alone inflation forecasts. Another advantage 
of a sample that starts in 1999 is that the distinction between inflation and non-inflation 
targeting economies becomes more apparent. Table 1 provides a succinct summary of 
the main characteristics of the monetary policy regimes in the nine economies 
considered in the study. The IT group virtually has the same inflation objectives, even if 
there are some subtle differences in what is targeted and the horizon over which 
inflation is targeted. The remaining economies also evince a strong interest in price 
stability though there are interesting differences in how the principal objectives of 
monetary policy are defined.  
Table 2 provides some details about the number and types of forecasts that are the 
subject of the econometric investigation described in the next section. A total of 77 
forecasts from a variety of sources are used. A majority of them (46) are from 
professionals or various international institutions such as the IMF (i.e., the World 
Economic Outlook, or WEO forecasts), or the OECD. Professional forecasts include the 
mean forecast from Consensus Economics, forecasts collected from The Economist 
                                                 
9 Siklos (2010) examines forecast disagreement relative to the U.S. experience since 1990 but also finds 
that some estimated relationships appear to break down toward the end of the 1990s. Whether the 
proximate cause is the Asian financial crisis, for example, is unclear.  
10  For example, the initial years of inflation targeting (approximately, 1990-1993) were in the form of 
inflation reduction targets in countries such as New Zealand and Canada.  
11 A plot (not shown) of inflation forecast errors for the 1990-2009 period in inflation targeting economies 
reveals that they are persistently positive (i.e., realized inflation is consistently below forecasted inflation) 
during the 1990-1998 sample. After that forecast errors are just as likely to be positive as they are 
negative. Also, see section 4 below.  
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magazine, as well as the Survey of Professional Forecasters U.S.A., and the euro area). 
Eight of nine central banks in the dataset provide forecasts.  The Reserve Bank of 
Australia does not publish staff or other internal forecasts.
12 An interesting aspect of 
central bank forecasts is whether these are conditioned, or not, on market interest rates. 
A difficulty with central bank forecasts is that, in some cases (e.g., the Bank of Canada), 
forecasts are only available since 2005. As a result, estimates below are based on 
unbalanced panels. Given how average forecast disagreement is evaluated (see 
equation (1)) this also means that the number of forecasts that can be included varies 
over time. I also tried  to include at least one household as well as one business survey 
among the survey-based forecasts. Finally, in a very few cases, I had to omit some 
forecasts due to the small number of available observations (see Table 2). Table 3 
provides the names of the sources for all the inflation forecasts available for the 
econometric analysis to follow. Data limitations also mean that forecast disagreement is 
evaluated only for a one year ahead horizon. There are too few longer horizon forecasts 
to adequately estimate other versions of equation (2). 
Table 3 also indicates whether the forecast is of the fixed event (i.e., a forecast for 
inflation for a particular calendar year) or fixed horizon (e.g., one quarter or one year 
ahead) variety. It is common in the literature to convert fixed event data into a fixed 
horizon using an admittedly ad hoc procedure.
13   The present study follows this 
convention although the impact on the results is likely small, partly because some of the 
econometric estimates are based on data averaged across forecasts.  
                                                 
12  No particular distinction is made below between staff or policy committee forecasts. Any apparent 
differences may be revealed from individual estimates discussed below.  
13 Consider a monthly forecast of inflation () for calendar year t, released in month m. Denote such a 
forecast as  ,
FE
mt   where FE refers to the fixed event nature of the forecast. Hence, a forecast for the fixed 
event one year ahead would be written  ,1
FE
mt   . The transformation from FE to FH, where FH represents a 
fixed horizon forecast, is  ,, , 1 [(13 ) 12] [( 1) 12]
FH FE FE
mt mt mt mm      .   
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The remaining variables consist of macroeconomic time series that were obtained from 
International Financial Statistics CD-ROM (February 2010 edition), the BIS, and the 
databases of the individual central banks covered in this study. 
Two other important considerations about the data require brief discussion. First, as 
shown in Table 3, forecasts range from the monthly through the semi-annual sampling 
frequencies. Monthly data are converted to the quarterly frequency through simple 
arithmetic averaging. Data at the semi-annual frequency are converted to quarterly data 
via quadratic-match averaging.
14 In the case of survey data, users face the additional 
burden of converting them from index form into percent changes, that is, in the form of 
an inflation rate. Two widely used approaches to carry out the transformation are called 
the regression and probability methods. The former is associated with the work of 
Pesaran (1985, 1987) while the latter is best known as stemming from the work of 
Carlson and Parkin (1975). Both techniques are used and the mean of the two resulting 
series serve as the proxy for inflation expectations or forecasts from the relevant 
survey-based data.
15  Finally, in constructing output and asset price gaps, the H-P filter 
with standard smoothing parameter of 1600 is employed. 
4.  What Explains Forecast Disagreement? Empirical Evidence 
Figure 1 plots the policy rate and CPI inflation for the nine economies in the sample for 
the period 1999Q1-2009Q4. Also shown are the inflation target ranges for the five IT 
central banks. In the case of the ECB, not an IT central bank, its self-declared inflation 
objective of not more than 2% inflation but exceeding zero, is also highlighted.
16 The 
                                                 
14 Essentially, this fits a local quadratic polynomial for each observation of the low frequency series. This 
polynomial is then used to fill in the missing observations at the higher frequency. 
15 As might be expected, there are pros and cons to using either technique. Smith and McAleer (1995) 
provide a comprehensive survey of the relevant literature. In addition, survey-based data are believed to 
display a bias that is not straightforward to correct as any adjustment may need to be idiosyncratic to the 
survey itself. For the case of Japanese data, see Ueda (2009) and references therein. While no bias 
corrections are made, some of the estimates presented in the following section strip out the survey-based 
forecasts to determine the sensitivity of the econometric results to the inclusion of this data. 
16 I refer to CPI as the measure of inflation used for all nine economies in the dataset. More precisely, 
however, for the euro area, it is the rate of change (annual rates) in the Harmonized Index of Consumer 
Prices (or HICP) which is used.  
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subdued nature of inflation over the sample is apparent as is the persistent deflation in 
the case of Japan. All the other economies, save Australia, also experience a brief bout 
of deflation toward the end of the sample as a result of the fallout from the global 
financial crisis. The impact of the events of 2007-2009 is also evident in the precipitous 
drop in policy rates. Note, however, that Australia is once again an exception as it is the 
only example where the policy rate rises near the end of the period shown. It is worth 
considering the behavior of asset prices as these series are not as widely available as 
are the others. Figure 2 shows the BIS’s data for nominal asset prices and residential 
property prices, expressed as deviations from an H-P filtered value.
17 The data for the 
IT and non-IT economies are plotted separately for convenience. With the exception of 
Australia which experiences two large positive gaps, once in the early 2000s and again 
beginning around 2007, the pattern of nominal aggregate asset prices is fairly 
comparable across all the economies considered. The sharp drop in nominal asset 
prices in 2008 reflects, of course, the impact of the crisis on financial wealth. The picture 
is somewhat more diverse as far as property prices are concerned, as shown in the 
bottom portion of the same figure.  Here the run-up in U.S. housing prices, as well as its 
subsequent collapse, is readily visible. The collapse in housing prices as a 
consequence of the global financial crisis appears more apparent in the IT group of 
countries than in the remaining economies considered. Moreover, persistent positive 
residential price gaps are also more in evidence in the lead up to the events of 2007-
2009 among the IT set of countries. Plots of most of the remaining series used to 
estimate equation (2) are not shown but are available on request. 
Figures 3 and 4 plot the inflation forecasts previously described (also see Table 3) 
followed by the forecast errors defined as the point forecast at time t less realized CPI 
inflation, also at time t. it is abundantly clear that there exists considerable diversity in 
inflation forecasts across economies and over time. Nor is it at all evident that the 
                                                 
17 Deflated values of these indexes constructed from the BIS were also made available but the original 
dataset only goes to the end of 2007 (see Siklos 2010). It is possible to construct a real index by deflating 
the nominal values by a consumption expenditures price index available for all the countries in the 
dataset from the OECD. However, the overall patterns resemble the ones shown in Figure 2. Hence, in 
what follows, I use the nominal version of the asset price gap.  
 
18
inflation target ranges, also shown in Figure 2, represent a constraining influence on 
forecasts of inflation since there are frequent departures from the stated inflation target 
range. In addition, such as in the case of Australia and the U.K., such departures can be 
persistent.
18 Figure 4 reveals a feature of the data previously noted by Granger (1996), 
namely that forecast errors are often positively correlated across forecasters. This 
appears to be true for all the economies considered. The stacked bars highlight this fact 
as the sign of the forecast errors is often positive or negative across most forecasts, 
regardless of their source. This also includes central bank forecasts.
19 Note, however, 
that this does not imply that all forecasts are equally accurate. An impression of the 
accuracy of each forecast is provided by the height of each bar.
20  Finally, it is also 
worth highlighting the fact that, even if the sign of forecast errors is similar across 
forecasts, there are frequent reversals in the sign of forecast errors for every economy 
considered, but most notably for Australia, Canada, Japan, and Switzerland. Therefore, 
this result is not the exclusive domain of IT regimes. One is tempted to conclude then 
that it should not be surprising that forecast errors are correlated under the 
                                                 
18 In the case of Australia it needs to be emphasized (see Table 3) that the inflation target is defined 
rather differently than elsewhere among the IT countries in the sample. In the case of the U.K. the 
frequent departures from the stated IT range take place beginning in 2007, precisely around the time the 
Governor of the Bank of England began to write what became a series of open letters 
(www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/inflation.htm) informing the Chancellor of the Exchequer that 
the upper range of the inflation target had been breached. Between April 2007 and May 2010 seven such 
letters have been written. This certainly appears to represent casual evidence that some forecasts at 
least (see below) are indeed attentive to the current state of the IT regime.  
19 It was suggested that instead of mean forecasts, the median of forecasts might be preferable. Thus, for 
example, the median of the forecasts for the majority of the Bank of Japan’s policy board are published 
but not the median of the entire committee. An illustration of the potential differences between the mean 
and the median for the case of BOJ forecasts is relegated to the appendix. However, in recent years the 
differences do not appear to be statistically significant. More importantly, since I am interested in the full 
range of forecasts using a median would exclude ‘outliers’ and it is not obvious that this is desirable under 
the circumstances, even if one were able to obtain median estimates for all of the available forecasts.  
20 A separate Table, available on request, provides the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) for each one of 
the forecasts shown in Figure 4. I also generated the test statistics for the Pesaran and Timmermann 
(1992) turning points test, that is, a test of the skill of forecasters at predicting changes in the direction of 
inflation. Relatively few forecasters display skill at predicting the timing of changes in inflation. 
Nevertheless, there is some evidence that Consensus forecasts, followed by OECD forecasts, display 
some ability to do so across the economies surveyed here and there are a few survey-based forecasts 
that similarly reveal an ability to forecast turning points in inflation.  
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circumstances and not because of any collusion among forecasters. It is equally 
implausible to presume that the assumptions and models used to generate forecasts 
are so similar as to produce the outcome shown in Figure 4. Instead, it is more likely 
that, at least until 2008, the benign macroeconomic environment made comparable 
inflation forecasts more likely. Thereafter, the sharp but predominantly global shock also 
led forecasts to be revised in a seemingly coordinated fashion. It must be emphasized, 
however, that the specifications used here are unable to identify which one of the 
explanations considered is the correct one.  
Next, figure 5 plots various indicators of forecast disagreement defined as in equation 
(1). Given Granger’s (1996) warning about the state of disagreement and overall 
economic performance recessions in the U.S., as dated by the NBER 
(www.nber.org/cycles.html), are super-imposed on the graphs for all the economies 
considered, not only in view of the potential role of U.S. forecasts on those elsewhere
21 
but also because, over the period considered, none of the other economies experienced 
a recession (www.cepr.org/data/dating; and www.businesscycle.com/home/). The role 
of the global financial crisis and its attendant effects on forecast disagreement is, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, particularly striking in the case of the U.S., the U.K., and the 
euro area. Nevertheless, several of the other economies considered also experience a 
sharp rise in inflation forecast disagreement, such as Sweden, Switzerland and Canada. 
Nevertheless, attention should be drawn to the fact that some forms of disagreement 
(e.g., survey-based forecasts) appear more sensitive to the influence of ‘bad’ times than 
other types of forecasts (i.e., forecasts for ‘common sources’, namely the OECD, the 
IMF’s WEO, and Consensus). To be sure this outcome is partly due to the original 
sampling frequency of the underlying forecasts (e.g., semi-annual in the case of the 
OECD and the WEO) and, possibly, the averaging of several forecasts (e.g., 
Consensus forecasts). Finally, it should be noted that while forecast disagreement 
displays a global element of sorts, no doubt stemming from the crisis of 2007-2009, 
there are also idiosyncratic elements in the evolution of forecast disagreement. For 
                                                 
21 There is some evidence (not shown) of convergence, in the sense of cointegration, between forecast 
disagreement in the U.S., and the other economies considered. However, as the sample is brief, no too 
much significance ought to be attached to this result.  
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example, there is a sharp rise in forecast disagreement in 1998-2000 in New Zealand, 
as well as a sharp rise in some of the indicators of disagreement for Japan during the 
2003-2006 period.  In the case of New Zealand there were indications back in the late 
1990s from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) that monetary policy was too 
loose while criticisms were also raised about the RBNZ’s forecasting performance. In 
the case of Japan the 2001-2006 period represented a time when interest rate guidance 
from the Monetary Policy Board was introduced and the Bank of Japan was in the 
throes of its quantitative easing policy (e.g., Shiratsuka (2009)). 
The general overview of the data is rounded out by considering the decomposition of 
inflation forecasts according to factor model estimates. Three examples are illustrated in 
Figure 6. The top figure shows estimates of the global and domestic factors driving 
inflation forecasts based on data using all forecasts, regardless of the source, across all 
economies examined. The middle figure repeats the exercise relying only on the survey-
based data while the bottom figure plots the case where only U.S. forecasts, from all 
sources, are considered in the factor model. What is particularly striking is that the 
global component, regardless of the forecast type, is highly correlated with realized 
inflation in each of the economies considered. The unconditional correlation coefficients 
range from a low of 0.32 for Sweden when the global components of inflation forecasts 
is obtained from U.S. data alone to a high of 0.90 between U.K.’s inflation rate and the 
global factor derived by using only survey-based evidence. Every single correlation pair 
is statistically significant at least at the 10% level of significance. In contrast, there is 
little, if any, correlation between the domestic element of forecasts and realized inflation. 
Virtually none of the unconditional correlations are statistically significant. Hence, global 
factors appear to play a role on explaining inflation outturns, at least over the period 
examined in this study. 
 I now turn to the econometric results. These are shown in Table 4 through 6. Tables 4 
and 5 present the quantile and mean regressions estimated for each economy 
individually while Table 6 gives the evidence based on a panel regression estimate via 
GMM. Examination of the forecast disagreement data (see Figure 6) suggests that the  
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distribution is typically skewed to the right. This is less true of realized inflation.
22 Hence, 
a mean regression may not be the most meaningful way of estimating the role of the 
various hypothesized determinants of forecast disagreement. Nevertheless, for the sake 
of comparison, estimates from a conventional regression are shown in Table 5. Quantile 
regression results are shown for the first and third quartiles, as well as the median. To 
conserve space shown only are cases where global and domestic components of 
inflation forecasts are based on all the available forecasts. As will be seen below for the 
panel regression estimates forecast type matters for some of the determinants of 
forecast disagreement considered.  
Transparency is found to increase forecast disagreement in all economies with the 
notable exception of the euro area where transparency has statistically significant 
impact and Japan, where transparency reduces forecast disagreement though the 
impact is economically small.
23  The same result extends to the mean regression 
estimates (see Table 5) although the coefficient is now also statistically insignificant in 
Japan’s case. Moreover, transparency affects forecast disagreement at all quantiles for 
Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K., and two of the three segments of the 
distribution examined for Australia and Japan. There is less evidence that the distinction 
between global and domestic determinants of inflation forecasts influences forecast 
disagreement while current and past monetary performance, as proxied by realized 
inflation, is seen to be inversely related to forecast disagreement in five of the nine 
economies considered.
24  Hence, a deterioration of monetary policy performance, as 
proxied by realized inflation, appears to raise forecast disagreement. The latter result 
does not show up as clearly when the regression on the mean is examined. Perhaps 
equally important is the finding that different variables matter to different forecasters, 
                                                 
22 Plots of the distribution of disagreement against inflation in the nine economies in the sample provide 
the details and a relegated to an appendix. 
23  For the U.S. the aggregate measure of central bank transparency displayed too little variation 
throughout the sample to be included in the specification. Specifically, there were only changes in political 
transparency according to the Dincer-Eichengreen index.  See Siklos (2010a). 
24  Canada is one of the only exceptions with forecast disagreement more sensitive to global factors 
relative to the domestic component of an inflation forecast.  
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depending on their position in the distribution of forecast disagreement. For example, 
commodity price inflation does not affect forecast disagreement among forecasters 
located in the highest quartile but is seen to be statistically significant for the lowest 
quantile shown. Similarly, asset prices that deviate from an H-P filtered trend tend to 
influence median forecast disagreement but less so the tails of the distribution.  In 
addition, there are considerable differences in both the size of coefficients as well as the 
variables that affect forecast disagreement depending on which group of forecast is 
permitted to explain forecast disagreement with the exception of the significance of 
central bank transparency.  
A difficulty with the quantile and mean regressions is that the results are sensitive to the 
presence of serially correlated errors.
25 Additionally, it is likely that cross-correlations in 
forecast disagreement are not entirely accounted for by the inclusion of the global factor 
explaining inflation forecasts. If any of the variables are thought to be endogenous, this 
may create further inference problems though with the relatively small sample size used 
here the correction may not be straightforward.
26 Perhaps most important, the individual 
regressions do not provide any information about the role of the monetary policy 
strategy. That is, the impact of transparency is co-mingled with the role of the IT policy 
strategy. As a consequence, while the results in Tables 4 and 5 do reveal that different 
forms of information matter to different forecasters they also provide an incomplete 
picture of the determinants of inflation forecast disagreement. 
Therefore, in Table 6, I turn to estimates of the panel regression estimated via GMM. 
Central bank transparency and the choice of monetary policy regimes are consistently 
statistically significant determinants of forecast disagreement. Central bank 
transparency is seen as increasing forecast disagreement in three of the five models 
                                                 
25 A separate Table, available as a separate appendix available on request, provides the details for the 
case shown in Tables 4 and 5. A version of the model with a lagged dependent variable, and a 
specification in first differences was also considered. Interestingly, the mean regression shows far fewer 
signs of serial correlation than some of the quantile regressions. 
26 Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008) consider the estimation of quantile regressions such as the ones 
presented here using instrumental variables estimation. Their procedure was not implemented here.   
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shown. It appears that the role of transparency is sensitive to whether U.S. based 
forecasts are excluded when extracting the global component of an inflation forecast. 
Moreover, disagreement appears far more sensitive to professional forecasters’ view 
about the inflation outlook than those extracted from survey-based estimates. The same 
result is obtained when the term spread is considered. A rise in the spread, ordinarily an 
indicator of improved future economic activity, reduces forecast disagreement but the 
effect is much larger among the non survey-based forecasters. Whether this has 
anything to do with the publicity given to monetary policy decisions is unclear. 
Nevertheless, Cornand and Heinemann’s (2008) hypothesis linking optimal 
transparency according to whether agents receive signals from policy makers is 
germane to this result.  
An economy that targets inflation experiences, other things equal, a lower level of 
forecast disagreement relative to the other economies considered but only when U.S. 
forecasts are excluded. The estimates are, unfortunately, not informative about the 
relative contribution of central bank forecasts, that is, whether their release is the reason 
behind the positive impact of IT on forecast disagreement. Data limitations pose a 
constraint in dealing with this question (see, however, EEF 2010).  
The panel setting also reveals that the global factor in forecasts of inflation is indeed a 
significant determinant of forecast disagreement. Forecast disagreement rises as the 
global component of an inflation forecast rises. The result does not carry over to the 
case where U.S. only forecasts are considered in the factor model that extracts the 
global component of inflation forecasts. Overall, the determinants of forecast 
disagreement can, with the exception of the role of transparency and inflation targets, 
be viewed as potentially complicating the task of monetary policy, assuming that a 
broad consensus is deemed to be desirable when it comes to the future outlook for 
inflation. In contrast, the results may also be seen as supporting the notion that there is 
no such thing as a broadly common view of one year ahead inflation rates and this 




If central banks have tended to downplay the connection between asset prices and 
inflation the same is not true of forecasters. Even when the inflation forecasts are 
constrained to the survey-based group there is a rise in disagreement whenever asset 
prices rise faster than trend. Finally, commodity prices play a negligible role in 
influencing forecast disagreement but this may in part be thanks to the role played by 
the global component of the inflation forecast. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study has considered the determinants of disagreement in forecasts of inflation in 
nine economies, five of which have an explicit inflation target. Instead of examining a 
single set of forecasts (e.g., Consensus or the Survey of Professional Forecasters) the 
paper examines a much wider array of inflation forecasts, including survey-based 
forecasts. In addition, in an effort to distinguish between local and external sources of 
forecast disagreement, a factor model is used to identify global versus the domestic 
components of inflation forecasts. 
Four main conclusions emerge from the empirical evidence. First, domestic inflation in 
particular and, to a lesser extent, forecast disagreement is related to the global 
component of inflation forecasts. Indeed, the similarity between global factors driving 
inflation forecasts and realized inflation is robust to the various stratifications used in the 
factor model to extract the global component. Nevertheless, when it comes to explaining 
forecast disagreement over time it matters greatly whether the forecast is generated, for 
example, by professional or institutions as opposed to ones obtained by examining 
survey-based estimates. Therefore, the second conclusion is that there are 
considerable gains in expanding the circle of forecast types in empirical studies of the 
kind performed here. Third, the prevailing ambiguities in theories linking transparency 
and, by implication, forecast disagreement while controlling for other factors seems 
replicated in the data. Part of the difficulty no doubt stems from the fact that central bank 
transparency changes more slowly than does forecast disagreement. Another difficulty 
is that, having isolated as best as possible economies that can reasonably be classified  
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as belonging to two separate groups in terms of their monetary policy strategy, namely 
inflation versus non-inflation targeting central banks, there remain subtle but important 
differences in how monetary policy is practiced by each monetary authority even within 
each of the groups considered.  More generally, however, the fourth main conclusion of 
the paper is that transparency, uniquely among the various determinants of forecast 
disagreement considered, matters a great deal. This effect is consistently found across 
all forecast types with the implication that more transparency always raises forecast 
disagreement, at least over the 1999-2009 period. 
To be sure, there are a number of ways one could improve on the present study. To the 
extent that asymmetries might plague the relationships of interest these were omitted 
from the various specifications tested. Next, it would be useful to extend the analysis to 
consider inflation expectations at longer horizons. For example, expectations extracted 
from inflation indexed bonds might be helpful the results of this paper suggest that this 
is not enough as it is important to also consider households and businesses views 
about long-term price trends in a cross-section of economies. Also problematic is that 
the data used to construct some of the quantitative determinants of forecast are not 
measured in real time but are quasi-final estimates of the series in question 
It is also possible that uncertainty plays a role in the evolution of forecast disagreement 
in a manner that is not easily measured. It should be noted, however, that since the 
quantile regressions provide estimates of the determinants of forecast disagreement 
across various locations in the distribution of forecast disagreement and, assuming that 
the position of various forecasts in that distribution captures some of the effects of 
forecast uncertainty, some of the estimates presented in this paper reveal that different 
forecasters focus on different variables when generating their forecasts depending on 
factors that are akin to a form of macroeconomic uncerainty. Finally, there is the matter 
of the sharp changes in forecast disagreement toward the end of the sample, a 
reflection of the impact of the global financial crisis. More data in future will permit an 
assessment of whether the relationships estimated here will hold if the period after 2007 
is best characterized by a different set of estimates than the ones presented here. 
Indeed, the positive association between transparency and disagreement may reflect  
 
26
the increased desire of forecasters to process publicly available information. In other 
words, a crisis may well have the effect of reducing inattention.  
Ultimately, however, it is important for policy makers, and those interested in 
understanding what drives forecasts, to move away from an excessive emphasis on 
point estimates, let alone arbitrarily selected point forecasts, and instead consider the 
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E .  Descriptors Used for Forecasts in Tables & Figures 
Forecast Name  Code
The Economist  ECON
Consensus  CONS
European Commission Consumer 
Survey
European Commission Business Survey 
ECC
ECB
European Central Bank  ECB Staff 
WEO World Economic Outlook 
Conference Board of Canada  CBD
Center for European Economic 
Research
ZEW
Reserve Bank of New Zealand  RBNZ
Market Scope (New Zealand)  Scope 
Tankan (Japan)  TANAO
Yougov Opinion Polling Survey (UK)  YOUGOV 
Greenbook, US Federal Reserve  GREEN 
Federal Open Market Committee (US)  FOMC 
Livingston Survey (US)  LIV 
Survey of Professional Forecasters (US, 
euro area) 
SPF
Bank of England (UK)  BOE




National Opinion Poll (UK)  NOP
Melbourne Institute (Australia)  MLB
Bank of Japan  BOJ 69
Bank of Japan Monetary Policy 
Committee 
PBOJMAJ (Majority of Committee) 
PBOJALL (Entire Committee) 
Bank of Canada Business Survey   BOC
New Zealand Institute for Economic 
Research
NZIER
Riksbank (Sweden)  RIKS 
Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
OECD 
Swiss National Bank  SNB
National Institute of Economic 
Research
NIER, BNIER, CNIER 
Infitted  Regression method conversion  
Infitted1  Probability approach conversion  70
F.  Last available observation  
Economy Forecast  Source 
Last Observation (M= month; Q= 
Quarter; S= Semi-Annual 
AUSTRALIA  Economist: 2010M04 
Consensus: 2009M12 
Melbourne Cons. Sentiment: 
2010M04
Melbourne Institute: 2009Q4 
Nat’l AUS Bank: 2009Q4 
WEO: 2009S2 
OECD: 2009S2 
CANADA  Economist: 2010M04 
Consensus: 2009M12 
Bank of Canada Survey: 2010Q1 
Conference Board: 2010Q1 
WEO: 2009S2 
OECD: 2009S2 
BoC Base case: 2010Q2 
EURO AREA  Economist: 2010M04 
Consensus: 2009M12 
European Commission: 2010M02 
ZEW: 2010M02 
Survey of Prof. Forecasters: 2009Q4 
WEO: 2009S2 
OECD: 2009S2 
JAPAN Economist: 2010M04 
Consensus: 2009M12 
ZEW: 2010M02 




BOJ MPC: 2010S1 
NEW ZEALAND  Economist: 2010M04 
Consensus: 2009M12 
RBNZ Survey: 2010Q1 
Marketscope: 2010Q1 
WEO: 2009S2  71
OECD: 2009S2 
RBNZ: 2010Q1 
SWEDEN  Economist: 2010M04 
Consensus: 2009M12 





SWITZERLAND  Economist: 2010M04 
Consensus: 2009M12 




UNITED KINGDOM  Economist: 2010M04 
Consensus: 2009M12 







UNITED STATES  Economist: 2010M04 
Consensus: 2009M12 
ZEW: 2010M02 
Survey of Prof. Forecasters: 2010Q1 
Livingston: 2009S2 
Wall Street Journal: 2009S2 
Michigan: 2009M08 
WEO: 2009S2 
OECD: 2009S2 
Greenbook: 2003Q4 
FOMC: 2010S1 